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EXERCISES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
BASED ON INTERNET WEB SITES
INTRODUCTION
Use of the Internet is growing at an exponential pace.' Every
segment of society is now "wired" to the Internet.2 Despite its
increased use, the body of law governing the Internet is not growing
at nearly the same rate. Traditionally, state lines defined the legal
boundaries of a court's jurisdiction.3 These geographic boundaries
were signposts that advised defendants when they were about to
enter another jurisdiction and therefore were subject to that
jurisdiction's laws. Because there are no physical boundaries in
cyberspace, the conventional analysis of personal jurisdiction is ill
suited to lawsuits involving the Internet. Existing jurisdictional
laws must be applied in a manner that recognizes the changes
brought about by technological and economic progress. Prior to the
1 See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (indicating that number of
Internet users is expected to grow from forty million individuals in 1996 to 200 million by
1999); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (estimating that number of Internet
users is expected to rise to 200 million by 1999); see also William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of
Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtnal Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
197, 197 n.2 (1995) (indicating Internet use has grown exponentially since 1990); Max S.
Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FLA. L. REV.
229, 231 (1999) ("[11n Justice Stevens' opinion...'the Internet has experienced extraordinary
growth'..."(quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997))); Philip Rollo, The Morass of
Internet Personal furisdiction: It Is Time for a Paradigm Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667, 676 (1999)
(indicating that most Americans have had at least minimal experience with Internet); Philip
Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soil of the Internet, TIME, July 25, 1994 at 50 (stating number of
Internet users doubles every year).
2 See e.g., www.jcrew.com; www.stjohns.edn; urww.whitehonse.gov; www.tnc.org.
3 See Robert W. Hamilton and Gre gory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal Jurisdiction and
the Internet, 24 No. 2 LrTiG. 27, 29 (1998) (discussing tension between personal jurisdiction law
and Internet because personal jurisdiction law is based on notion that physical boundaries
create legal boundaries); Leonard Klingbaum, Bensusan Resturaunt Corp. v. King: An Erroneous
Application of Personal Jnrisdiction Law to Internet-Based Contacts (Using the Reasonableness Test to
Ensnre Fair Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Cyberspace Contacts), 19 PACE L. REV. 149,
149 (1998) (discussing constitutional limitations on long-arm jurisdiction based solely on
Internet presence in forum state); Christian E. Manmen, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: The
Timing of Contracts for furisdiction and Venue Under 28 U.S.C. §1391, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 707,
712 (1993) (stating personal jurisdiction normally is determined by state borders, not judicial
districts).
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creation of the Internet, jurisdictional concepts were adequate.
However, in today's society, those arcane legal principles lose their
relation to reality, and injustice rather than justice, will be promoted.
Personal jurisdiction law based on the Internet is still in its "infant
stages."4 The district courts and the few circuit courts that have
dealt with the issue are split, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule
on the issue of personal jurisdiction based on the presence of Web
sites on the Internet. Judge Van Graafland, of the Second Circuit,
likened the process of creating Internet law to "trying to board a
moving bus."5 It is imperative that the courts come to some
consensus on the matter of personal jurisdiction based on Internet
contact. The lack of certainty and uniformity in this area will inhibit
businesses from utilizing the numerous benefits of the Internet.
The first part of this note will provide a history and explanation of
personal jurisdiction. The second part will provide background
information on the Internet. This information will aid in a better
understanding of the difficulties inherent in applying existing law to
this technological medium. The third part of this note will be an
overview of the cases that have tackled the issue of personal
jurisdiction over defendants based on the Internet. Finally, the
fourth part will provide an avenue for the courts to explore in
dealing with this issue.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction is the "court's power to bring a person into
its adjudicative process." 6 In order for a court to establish personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the court must
determine whether the forum state's long arm statue allows
jurisdiction and whether that assertion of personal jurisdiction
comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
4 See Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Corn, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (stating in
recent years Internet has made it possible to do business around world from desktop); see also
Millennium Enters. Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 914 (D. Or. 1999) (stating
personal jurisdiction of Internet seems to be all or nothing scenario, but courts are attempting
to issue specific guidelines); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 39 (D.
Mass. 1997) (stating case law concerning Internet is limited).
5 See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying well-
established jurisdiction principles to Internet case).
6 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999) (stating personal jurisdiction is also known
as "in personam jurisdiction," "jurisdiction in personam," "jurisdiction of the person,"
"jurisdiction over the person"); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977) (noting that
court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over defendant's person).
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Amendment.7 The Due Process Clause8 establishes the outer
limitations of a state's power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant.9 The only limitation state legislators face
when drafting long arm statutes is that they may not allow a basis
for jurisdiction which violates the Due Process Clause.10 However,
states are free to make their long arm statutes as limited as they
desire.1 1 Once the court has determined that the forum state's long
arm statute allows personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the
court must next inquire as to whether that assertion of jurisdiction
comports with the constitutional requirements of Due Process. 12
7 See FLEMMING JAMES, JR., ET. AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §2.3 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that while
due process is concern, there is also issue of comity towards other states, and not usurping
their state power); Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction
Over World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2250 (1997) (stating that due
process requires case-by-case determination before specific jurisdiction over non-resident
defendant may be asserted); Christine E. Mayewski, Note, The Presence of a Web Site as a
Constitutionally Permissible Basis for Personal Jurisdiction, 73 IND. L.J. 297, 299-300 (1997)
(discussing limits of personal jurisdiction on Internet companies).
8 See U.S. CONST. Amend XIV § 1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides in part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .. " See id.
9 See Serge G. Auakian, Global Unfair Coipetition in the Online Commerce Era, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 905, 926 n.108 (1999) (describing two-part process used to determine whether state has
personal jurisdiction over party); Ronald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague
Judgments Convention, 60 U PrrT. L. REV. 661, 671 n.32 (1999) (stating long-arm statutes must
conform with 14th Amendment); Veronica M. Sanchez, Taking a Byte Out of Minimum Contacts:
A Reasonable Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Trademark Disputes, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1671, 1676 (1999) (stating Due Process Clause limits states' long-arm statutes).
10 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945) (noting that due
process requires non-residents to have sufficient minimum contacts with forum state such that
judgement will not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"); see also
Kalow, supra note 7, at 2250 (stating that, although it may impose further limitations, state's
legislature is bound by strictures of Due Process Clause); Mayewski, supra note 7, at 300 n.17
(citing states such as California, Louisiana and Missouri as examples of states whose long arm
statutes allow exercise of personal jurisdiction up to boundaries set by Due Process Clause).
11 See Kalow, supra note 7, at 2250 (providing Pennsylvania long arm statute, 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. 5322(a), as example of long arm statute which does not extend state's power over
non-resident defendants to full extent of Due Process Clause); Mayewski, supra note 7, at 299-
300. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.&R. §302(a) (McKinney 1990) (allowing New York courts to
assert personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who (1) transact business within
state or contract to supply goods and services within state; or (2) commit tortious act within
state; or (3) commit tortious act out of state which injures person or property in state).
12 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (stating this restriction is both
guarantee of immunity from burden of defending against distant or inconvenient litigation
and consequence of comity between states in limiting their power so as not to encroach on
power of other states); see also Auakian, supra note 9, at 926 (describing how courts must
determine whether long-arm statutes comport with Due Process Clause).
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A. The Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to International
Shoe
In Pennoyer v. Neff,13 the Supreme Court held that "every state
possesses exclusive jurisdiction... over persons and property
within its territory." 14  Thus, in order to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant had to be within the
physical boundaries of the forum state.iS However, citizens of the
forum were subject to personal jurisdiction within that state, even
when they were not physically present in the State.16 As technology
progressed, commerce between the states increased and as
improvements in communications and transportation made
defending a suit in a foreign jurisdiction less burdensome, the
requirements for a forum state to exercise personal jurisdiction
"evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, to the flexible
standard of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington."17 In
International Shoe Company v. State of Washington,18 the Supreme
Court promulgated a flexible, fact specific, 19 two-tiered "minimum
contacts" test, stating that:
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice'. 20
The critical concern in ascertaining whether a forum state may
exercise jurisdiction following the decision in International Shoe is the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the subject matter
13 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
14 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
15 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723 (stating that to do otherwise would be "encroachment" on
other states' power over their citizens or property situated within state).
16 See Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1941) (allowing exercise of personal jurisdiction
over absent citizen because "[t]he state which accords him privileges and affords protection to
him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties").
17 See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.
18 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19 See Mayewski, supra note 7, at 301 (explaining test is "fact-centered"); Rex R.
Perschbacher, Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28
U.C. DAVis L. REV. 513, 513 (1995) (noting that International Shoe has replaced rigid theory of
Pennoyer); Steven M. Wald, The Left-For-Dead Fiction of Corporate "Presence:" Is It Revived by
Burnham?, 54 LA. L. REV. 187, 189-90 (1993) (stating that International Shoe favors flexible
"fairness" approach).
20 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1941)).
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of the litigation.21
B. Minimum Contacts
In order for the court to establish minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum state, the activities of the defendant must
be continuous and systematic. 22 The minimum contacts analysis can
create personal jurisdiction in two ways.23 A court can assert specific
jurisdiction over a defendant where the defendant's activities within
the forum state are the subject of the suit.24 A court can exercise
general jurisdiction where the continuous and systematic activities
of a corporation or party within the forum are "so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify" 25 the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
This exercise of general jurisdiction is permissible even when the
cause of action in the forum state is not connected to defendant's
activities within the state.26
Following International Shoe,27 the Court expanded the permissible
breadth of state court jurisdiction over non-resident defendants,
which was in part a response to advancements in technology and its
21 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977); see also Donna Metcalfe Ducey, Lockert v.
Breedlove: The North Carolina Supreme Court Rejects the Minimum Contacts Analysis Under the
"Transient Rule" of Jurisdiction, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1051, 1055-56 (1988) (noting International Shoe
focused on due process requirements necessary for in personam jurisdiction); Holly S.
Haskew, Shaffer, Burnham, and New York's Continuing Use of QIR-2 Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J.
239, 240 (1996) (discussing International Shoe's minimum contacts standard); Harold S. Lewis,
Jr., The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of
Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 706 (1983) (discussing concept of minimum
contacts, and relationship of defendant and forum state).
22 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; see also Pierre Riou, General Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations: All that Glitters Is Not Gold Issue Mining, 14 REV. LrIG. 741, 760-70 (1995)
(discussing notion of continuous and systematic contacts); Robert L. Theriot, Specific and
General Jurisdiction - The Reshuffling of Minimum Contacts Analysis, 59 TUL. L. REV. 826, 827-28
(1985) (discussing continuous and systematic requirement).
23 See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15
(1984) (discussing distinction between general and specific personal jurisdiction).
24 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; see also Rhonda S. Liebman, Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH:
The Long Arm Statute as a Protectionist Device, 4 J. INTL. L. Bus. 323, 329 (1982) (noting cause of
action must arise from defendant's activities in forum); Mark M. Maloney, Specific Personal
Jurisdiction and the "Arise from or Relate to" Requirement... What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH & LEE
L. REV. 1265, 1266-67 (1993) (discussing specific jurisdiction when activity within forum gives
rise to cause of action).
25 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
26 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining, 342 U.S. 437,
448 (1952) (allowing Ohio state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over Philippine
corporation doing business in Ohio during World War II, because all key corporate officers,
company office, company's files, and company bank accounts were located in Ohio, and
President of company carried on correspondence relating to business from Ohio).
27 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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impact on the economy.28 In these decisions, the Court held that
where a party has established sufficient minimum contacts, the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by the forum was valid.29 However,
the cause of action must be based on minimum contacts that have a
substantial connection to the forum state,30 and those contacts are so
meaningful that they give rise to an overriding state interest in
adjudicating the claims in the forum state.31 It remains a
requirement, however, that a defendant purposefully avails himself
of the privilege of doing business in the forum 32 or specifically
targets the forum state for business.33 Furthermore, the contact must
be so substantia 3 4 that being haled into that forum state to defend a
28 See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that California had
jurisdiction over Texas insurer because insurer transacted business with California resident);
see also David G. Thomas, Personal Jurisdiction in the Nebulous Regions of Cyberspace: A Call for
the Continued Relaxation of Due Process and Another Debilitating Blow to Territorial Jurisdiction, 31
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 507, 508-09 (1997) (noting Court has relaxed and redefined constitutional
limits of due process in response to changes and advances in technology).
29 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (allowing exercise of personal jurisdiction
over driver passing through state who was involved in collision as valid exercise of power
which did not conflict with Due Process); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 476 (1985) (dealing with franchise owners in distant states); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984) (allowing personal jurisdiction over defendant because defendant
distributed magazines within state); McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (selling insurance by telephone
solicitation in California was sufficient to justify personal jurisdiction).
30 See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80 (allowing New York resident access to New Hampshire
court in suit for defamation against Hustler magazine); Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48 (finding
jurisdiction over Philippine company because of business connections in Ohio); see also Repp
v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 851, 852-53 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (subjecting Holiday Inns to suit
for action arising in Tennessee); Glover v. Western Airlines, Inc., 745 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Alaska
1987) (allowing Alaskan resident access to state court for suit against Avis, USA, because of
substantial connection to forum through relationship with franchisee).
31 See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476 (holding that continuous but limited activity in
forum state will support jurisdiction over claims arising from activity); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780
(finding personal jurisdiction even though defendant's acts had greater impact in other
states); McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (upholding jurisdiction over claim arising out of single contact
solicited in state).
32 See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (holding that
Oklahoma could exert jurisdiction over manufacturer if manufacturer serves market directly
or indirectly, but state could not exercise personal jurisdiction over car dealer who had not
deliberately focused on Oklahoma as market for its cars); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958) (emphasizing that defendant must make some deliberate choice to relate to state in
some meaningful way before bearing burden of defending in forum). But see Mark C. Weber,
Purposefid Avaihnent, 39 S.C.L. REV. 815, 865-71 (1988) (criticizing emphasis on defendant's
purposeful in-state contacts).
33 See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476 (acknowledging that defendant who is not
physically present in forum, but who specifically targeted state to conduct business, cannot
defeat jurisdiction); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 (finding defendant had purposely availed itself of
opportunity to engage in in-state activities by distributing its magazines within state). But see
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) (finding contacts
with state were not sufficient to warrant personal jurisdiction over defendant).
34 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that foreseeability is necessary, but
not sufficient basis, for exercising personal jurisdiction); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78
S.Ct. 1228 (1958) (if foreseeability alone were enough, exercise of personal jurisdiction would
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suit is foreseeable. 35 It should be noted that the application of the
minimum contacts test is somewhat different when the cause of
action involves intentional torts such as defamation.36 In such cases,
courts have upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants because the defendant targeted the state
through its knowledge that the injury would be felt in the forum
state, and could reasonably foresee being haled into court in the
forum state to defend its actions.37
C. Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Once minimum contacts are established, the court must next
determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant would offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."38 While this second factor was once considered
have been sustained because it was foreseeable that settler of trust would move to Florida).
35 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). There continues
to be a great deal of debate around the issue of the purposeful availment requirement when a
defendant can reasonably foresee that its goods will enter the forum state through the "stream
of commerce." The Asahi Court split on the question of whether the act of selling goods
outside the forum state, which will foreseeably be imported into the forum state for resale, is
sufficient grounds to support personal jurisdiction. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion,
joined by three other Justices, rejected the premise that "mere awareness" that the stream of
commerce may sweep goods into the forum state after they have left the defendant's hands is
enough to show "purposeful availment." O'Connor would require clearer evidence that
defendant sought to serve market in a particular state before personal jurisdiction would
ensue. Id. at 112-13.
In contrast, the concurring Justices in Asahi would find that sending goods into the
stream of commerce, at least in substantial quantities, constitutes "purposeful availment,"
whether or not the original maker foresees that the goods will be sold in a particular state. Id.
at 117. The rationale behind this view is that the manufacturer both foresees and benefits from
such sales in other states, whether it distributes the goods directly or simply takes advantage
of this fact through someone else's efforts.
The ambiguity in the decision has led to a corresponding split in the circuits. Some
courts continue to apply a fairly broad stream-of-commerce approach based on the Supreme
Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980), and
invoke jurisdiction in cases that Justice O'Connor's approach would not reach. See, e.g., Barone
v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks, 25 F.3d 610, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1994). Others appear
to adopt Justice O'Connor's view. See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 944-
45 (4th Cir. 1994); Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir.
1993).
36 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) (holding that California had personal
jurisdiction over defendant concerning allegedly defamatory article written in Florida); Hugel
v. McNell, 886 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1989); (holding New Hampshire could exert personal
jurisdiction over defendant who allegedly defamed plaintiff in Washington Post article); see
also Rollo, supra note 1, at 675 (reviewing cases and decisions regarding defamation).
37 See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789 -90; McNeil, 886 F.2d at 4-5. But see Noonan v. Winston Co.,
135 F.3d 85, 90 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that Massachusetts could not subject French magazine
publisher to personal jurisdiction because publisher had insufficient contacts and did not
intentionally injure plaintiff).
38 See Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (stating that
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of relatively little importance, it might be of significantly more
importance since the Court's decision in Asahi Metal Industry
Company v. Superior Court of California,39 as eight of the nine justices
agreed that despite the requisite minimum contacts, jurisdiction
could not be upheld under the second prong of International Shoe.40
In determining whether such an exercise of personal jurisdiction
comports with notions of fair play and substantial justice, the courts
look to the burden on defendant in defending itself in the forum
state.41 Recently, courts began to look not only at the burden the
defendant would have to bear in defending against this litigation,
but also to (1) the forum state's interest in having the claim
adjudicated in that state;42 (2) the plaintiff's interest in having that
"When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff.., will
justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant."); Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at
476 (holding that defendants failed to demonstrate how jurisdiction in that forum would be
fundamentally unfair); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780-81 (finding that defendant's regular circulation
of magazines in New Hampshire was sufficient to support exercise of personal jurisdiction);
Calder, 465 U. S. at 790 (stating individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek
redress); Brother Records v. Harper Collins, 682 A.2d 714, 718 (N.H. 1996) (finding jurisdiction
based on defendant's acts aimed toward forum residents); Beth I. Boland & Diane Gwin, The
Internet and Personal Jurisdiction Under the Constitution: In Vhat State, Exactly, Is the Internet
Located?, 44 B. B.J. 16, 16 (2000) (discussing "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice"); E. Gabriel Perle, John Taylor Williams & Mark A. Fischer, Electronic Publishing and
Software, Part II, 17 COMP. L. 15, 15 (2000) (discussing fairness).
39 480 U.S. 102 (1987). See generally Boland & Gwin, supra note 38, at 17 (discussing Asahi);
Lonny Hoffman, Forum Non Conveniens-State and Federal Movements, 63 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 265, 278
(1999) (discussing Asahi); Aristotle G. Mirzaian, Y2K MAho Cares? We Have Bigger Problems:
Choice of Law in Electronic Contracts, 6 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 18, 79 (1999/2000) (discussing Asahi).
40 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463); see also Mayewski,
supra note 7, at 301-302 (explaining that although Justices could not agree on contacts issue,
they did come to consensus on reasonableness issue). But see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476
(concluding that Florida had legitimate interest in resolving dispute); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that California had "manifest interest in providing
effective means of redress for its residents with respect to insurance claims"). See, e.g., Pritzer
v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that Puerto Rico had significant interest in
land ownership dispute); Weiss v. La Suisse, 69 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding New
York's laws governing insurance contracts create significant state interest in adjudicating
dispute).
41 See Tara Blake, Jurisdiction Over Communication Torts: Can You Be Pulled Into Another
Country's Court System for Making a Defamatonj Statement Over the Internet? A Comparison of
English and U.S. Law, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 489, 528 (1996) (discussing burden); Peter Brown,
New Issues in Internet Litigation, 471 P.L.I./PAT. 151, 179 (1997) (discussing burden analysis);
Sonia K. Gupta, Bulletin Board Systems and Personal Jurisdiction: What Com ports with Fair Play
and Substantial Justice?, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 532 (1996) (stating that burden on defendant
is always of primary concern in determining reasonableness of personal jurisdiction); Perle,
Williams & Fischer, supra note 38, at 24 n.3 (stating "reasonableness inquiry requires
consideration of the burden on the defendant").
42 See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (holding that California had "manifest interest in providing
effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims' and that
such interest, combined with small inconvenience to defendant insurer, was sufficient to
allow California to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant insurance company); see also
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (explaining that procedural and substantive laws of other nations must
be weighed); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (stating that these considerations can establish
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claim adjudicated in that forum; 43 (3) the interest of the judicial
system as a whole in providing the most efficient resolution of
controversies; 44 and (4) the interests of the several states in
furthering social policies.45 These factors have reduced the incidence
of inconvenient litigation.46 Despite these changes to personal
jurisdiction, the Court cautioned that even though the rigid rule of
Pennoyer has been abandoned, "the reasonableness of asserting
jurisdiction over the defendant must be assessed 'in the context of
our federal system of government."' 47 The Court, in support of the
federal system of government, has "never accepted the proposition
that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes" as the
Framers.. .intended that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including...the sovereign power to try
jurisdiction upon lesser showing of minimum contacts); World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (enumerating considerations courts should consider).
43 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114-16 (discussing same); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (considering
this factor in its decision); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that "implicit in this
emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while
always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant
factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute..."); Kulko v.
California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (discussing same); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 192 (1977) (discussing plaintiff's interests as factor); see also Ruckstuhl v. Owens Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 731 So. 2d 881, 891 (La. 1999) (finding that all states' interests are furthered in
Louisiana's pursuit of defendant as part of tobacco litigation).
44 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (discussing judicial system interest).
Coinpare Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-77 (suggesting that where defendant has purposely
directed activities to forum state, jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable and defendant will
have to make "compelling case" that other considerations make jurisdiction unreasonable),
and Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (holding that it is not unreasonable for writer to
defend defamation suit in California), with Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (finding that jurisdiction
exercised by California court would be unreasonable and unfair); see also Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984) (reversing Texas Supreme
Court holding of personal jurisdiction over defendant due to unreasonableness).
45 See Asaiii, 480 U.S. at 115-16 (discussing interests of several states); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 293; (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317,
(1945)); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (requiing defendant to take some
purposeful act toward forum before jurisdiction will lie); Lisa M. Hong, Montanez Miranda v.
Banico Progreso, S.A.C.A., 11 N.Y. INT. L. REV. 141, 144 n.20 (1998) (stating state's interests in
adjudicating claim is factor); Martin A. McCrory, Crown Cork and Branch Metal: Personal
Jurisdiction and the Nezv Defense to Landowner's CERCLA Contribution Claims, 27 REAL EST. L.J.
287, 294 n.35 (1999) (discussing forum state's interests in adjudicating claim).
46 See Burger King Corp, 471 U.S. at 476 (stating that these considerations might support
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction on lesser showing of minimum contacts); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292 (stating same).
4 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 293 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 317 (1945) and stating, "we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of
interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution."); see also John N. Drobak, The Federalism
Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1066 n.120 (1983) (quoting same passage
from Int'l Shoe); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 722 (1987) (quoting same passage from Int'l Shoe).
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causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied
a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States - a limitation
express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment.48
Thus, while the Court has expanded a forum state's power to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, it has maintained that
there is a limit to which a forum's jurisdiction may reach.49
II. HOW THE INTERNET WORKS
There are millions of computers all over the world, many of
which are linked by networks.50 The Internet is a spider web of
larger networks, which connect smaller networks of linked
computers.51 The Internet had its genesis in an experimental
Department of Defense project, the Advanced Research Projects
Administration ("ARPA"), whose goal was to link the computer
networks of the military, defense contractors and university
laboratories conducting research.52 ARPA had two goals: first, to
48 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293; Maloney, supra note 24, 1301 n.202
(discussing assertions of personal jurisdiction); David E. Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Defendants: Reprise, 4 WIDENERJ. PUBLic L. 199, 215 (1994) (expanding on quote).
49 See Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REV.
565, 573 (1999) (discussing importance of physical boundaries); Katherine C. Sheehan,
Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 385,
440 n.90 (1998) (stating linitations); David G. Thomas, supra note 28, at 534 rL66 (reiterating
these limitations).
50 See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (detailing computer
networks) off d, 521 U.S. 1113 (1997); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(discussing computer networks) affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Bruce Braun, Dane Drobny &
Douglas C. Gessner, LWWW.Coin nercial Terrorismn.Coin: A Proposed Federal Crininal Statute
Addressing the Solicitation of Counmercial Terrorism Through the Internet, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
159, 175 (2000) (stating there are millions of computers all over world); Phillip E. Lewis, A
Brief Comment on the Application of the "Contemporanj Community Standard" to the Internet, 22
CAMPBELL L. REV. 143, 156 (1999) (discussing present number of computers); Edward B.
Praytor, Innovative Solutions for Computer Technology Disputes, 54 DisP. RESOL. J. 8, 10 (1999)
(stating number of computers existing).
51 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 925-26 (discussing computer networks); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at
830-31 (explaining that small networks, also known as local area networks, are connected to
other networks allowing any computer in network to communicate with any other computer
in network); see also Andrew R. Basile, Jr., Recent Developments: Intellectual Property Law & the
Internet, 584 P.L.I./PAT. 293, 295 (1999) (stating Internet is network of computers); Shelley
Ross Saxer, One Professor's Approach to Increasing Technology Use in Legal Education, 6 RICH. J. L.
& TECH. 21, 28 (2000) (stating same).
52 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating that sending "packet-switching" messages from
one computer to another, subdivided into smaller "packets" when sent independently to
destination, each traveling along different links in overlapping systems, and having those
"packets" reassembled upon arrival, ensured that necessary communications would be
feasible if any portion of network was not functioning); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831 (stating
government sought to create system which would facilitate continuance of communication
even when portions of system were damaged by creating redundant system of linked
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enable remote use of powerful supercomputers not located in their
local areas; and second, to ensure vital communication in the event
of war.53 Utilizing the system created by ARPA, companies created
similar networks, which linked universities, research facilities, and
commercial entities.54 Eventually these faster systems were linked
together, and it is this series of linked networks which gradually
superceded ARPA, and is the Internet as we know it today.5 5 Since
the Internet is a spider web of connected networks that lacks a
centralized storage location, control point, or communications
channel, it is impossible for any single entity or group to control the
Internet.56
Individuals can access cyberspace,57  and the Internet in
computers, allowing communications sent over overlapping linked system to travel any
number of routes to its destination).
53 See generally Richard Cullen & Pinky D. W. Choy, The Internet in China, 13 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 99, 101-02 (1999) (discussing history of Internet); Kent N. Schneider & Timothy P.
Hedley, The World Wide Web: A Promising Tool for Legal Research, 52 J. MO. B. 301, 301 (1999)
(describing Internet's evolution); John C. Yates & Michael R. Greenlee, Intellectual Property on
the Internet: Balance of Interests Between the Cybernauts and the Bureaucrats, 8 J. PROPRIETARY
RIGHTS 8, 8 (1996) (discussing origin of Internet).
54 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (noting high speed networks that developed included
NSFNet, sponsored by National Science Foundation, regional networks, and large commercial
networks run by entities such as Sprint, IBM, and Performance Systems International); ACLU,
929 F. Supp. at 832 (giving examples of these networks such as BITNET, CSNET, FIDONET
and USERNET); see also Daniel V. Logue, If the International Shoe Fits, Wear It: Applying
Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Analysis to Cyberspace in Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 42 VILL. L.
REV. 1213, 1254 n.3 (1997) (citing discussion in Shea detailing growth of university, research
facility, and commercial entity networks from ARPA); Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the
Internet: Fundainental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. So. & TECH. 339,
381 n.20 (1996) (stating that ARPA was backbone of other networks that were formed).
55 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating that demise of ARPANet, which formally ceased
operations in 1990, came as most network traffic shifted away from ARPANet to these faster
networks); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832 (noting that ARPANet ceased to exist as similar
networks developed to link sites around world); see also Logue, supra note 54, at 1254 n.3
(citing discussion in Shea describing development of Internet from ARPA); Rollo, supra note 1,
at 676-77 (noting that Internet grew out of ARPA).
56 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (indicating that because Internet links together
independent networks no single entity or group of entities is able to control or limit it); ACLU,
929 F. Supp. at 832 (noting that single entity controlling of all information on Internet would
not be technically feasible); see also Byassee, supra note 1, at 200-201 (noting that Internet
operates through informal agreements by users and stronger agreements by owners of large
computers, nationally linked through high-speed telephone connections, thus creating no
central governing authority); Rollo, supra note 1, at 694 n.109 (quoting Shea, and discussing
inability of any single entity to control or limit Internet).
57 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832 (indicating that users have many ways to access
cyberspace); see also Byassee, supra note 1, at 220 n.5 (defining term cyberspace and giving
credit for coining term to science fiction author William Gibson); John D. Faucher, Let the Chips
Fall Where They May: Choice of Lazo in Computer Bulletin Board Defamation Cases, 26 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1045, 1078 n.9 (1993) (noting computer activist's description of cyberspace);
Oppenheimer, snpra note 1, at 231 (discussing fact that together various methods of Internet
information and communication retrieval constitute cyberspace); Zembek, supra note 54, at
381 n.12 (explaining origins of term "cyberspace"). See generally Edward A. Cavazos &
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particular, 58 in a wide variety of ways. An individual can access the
Internet either by use of a computer that is directly, and usually
permanently linked to the Internet,59 or by use of a personal
computer with a telephone modem 60 connected to a larger network
of computers that is itself directly linked to the Internet.61 Access to
the Internet can take a variety of forms.62 Many universities and
other educational institutions, 63 as well as businesses, 64 libraries, 65
Gavino Morin, Cyberspace and the Law: Your Rights and Duties in the On-Line World 1 (1994)
(discussing that in his book Neuroinancer, Gibson described cyberspace as hallucination
resembling physical space which was computer-generated through abstract data).
58 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (pointing out that access to Internet can take any one of
several forms); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832 (noting that individuals have multiple avenues to
access Internet in particular); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231 (noting that
individuals can obtain access to Internet from many different sources); Charles R. Topping,
The Surf Is Up, but VWho Owns the Beach? - VWho Should Regulate Commerce on the Internet?, 13
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 179, 198 (1999) (citing ACLU v. Reno, noting that
individuals can access Internet in several ways). See generally Margot Slade, E-Mail, E-
Conimerce and Now E-Buildings, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1999 at 11(1) (describing consumers' use of
E-Buildings as new form of direct Internet access).
59 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (indicating many entities maintain computer networks
directly linked to Internet system); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832 (stating that usually computer is
connected to network which is permanently and directly connected to Internet); see also
Schneider & Hedley, supra note 53, at 301 (discussing direct connection option via local area
network (LAN)); Slade, supra note 58, at I (defining "direct connection").
60 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 n.4 (defining modem as "as a device that translates digital
information into a signal for transmission over a telephone line ('modulation') and translates a
signal received over a telephone line into digital information ('demodulation')"); ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 832 (stating personal computers must have modem to access Internet); see also
Schneider & Hedley, supra note 53, at 301 (describing how to obtain dial-up access to Internet);
Slade, supra note 58, at I (defining "dial-up connection").
61 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 n.4 (stating signal is sent over telephone lines); ACLU, 929
F. Supp. at 832 (indicating that modems connect over telephone line to larger computer, or
computer network); see also Byassee, supra note 1, at 198 (indicating computers are linked over
telephone lines); Slade, supra note 58, at 1 (defining computer access to Internet via "cable
modem").
62 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (noting "[a]ccess to the Internet can take any one of several
forms"); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832 (indicating there are variety of entities through which
individuals gain access to Internet); see also Byassee, supra note 1, at 198 (providing overview
of forms of Internet access); Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231 (indicating there are many
different forms and methods for achieving Internet access).
63 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating that many educational institutions maintain direct
Internet access); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832 (stating that students and faculty are provided
with access to Internet, often through direct connections in university libraries, offices,
computer centers, and dorm rooms); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231 (stating that
majority of colleges and universities provide Internet access for their students and faculty);
Topping, supra note 58, at 198 (noting that educational institutions, primarily universities,
provide Internet access to their constituents).
64 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating that many businesses maintain direct Internet
access); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832-33 (stating corporations and other employers have found
Internet resources and access sufficiently important to provide Internet connections for their
employees); see also Byassee, supra note 1, at 200 (indicating corporate networks structure
services with scope of their membership in mind); Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231
(explaining that many employees have Internet access through office network provided by
employer); Zembek, supra note 54, at 345 (stating businesses utilize Internet to form contracts,
business relations, and financial exchanges).
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and individual communities, maintain computer networks that are
directly linked to the Internet.66  Moreover, Internet Service
Providers, 67 national commercial on-line services, 68 bulletin board
systems (known as BBSs),69 and commercial entities,70 offer users
Internet access.
Once the user has gained Internet access, he may utilize a variety
of methods 71 to transmit and receive text, data, computer programs,
65 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating that many libraries maintain Internet access);
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 833 (stating many local libraries offer free Internet use to their patrons,
and in addition, some offer telephone modem access to libraries' computers which are directly
linked to Internet); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231 (explaining that many local
libraries provide free Internet access); Topping, supra note 58, at 198 (citing ACLU v. Reno,
which noted that local libraries offer patrons use of Internet linked computers).
66 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating users are issued account numbers and passwords
which allow them access to these networks either directly or by modem); ACLU, 929 F. Supp.
at 832 (stating that many communities, such as Richmond, Virginia; Tallahassee, Florida;
Seattle, Washington; and San Diego California, have followed example of Cleveland Free-Net
Community Computer System and established community networks, called "free links," to
provide their citizens with link to Internet); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231 (stating
that many communities provide free access); Topping, supra note 58, at 198 (citing discussion
in ACLU v. Reno, regarding provision of Internet access by individual communities).
67 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating commercial entities which provide Internet access
generally do so by providing modem access to computers or networks for monthly fee);
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 833 (stating some Internet service providers are non-profit
organizations that provide Internet access either at low cost or for free); see also Elmer-Dewitt,
sutpra, note 1, at 50 (stating that dozens of small businesses sell monthly Internet access
starting at $10-$30); Schneider & Hedley, supra note 53, at 302 (discussing obtaining dial-up
Internet access through Internet service providers).
68 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating national commercial on-line services offer
subscribers both Internet access and proprietary computer networks which also contain
extensive information); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 833 (stating major service providers such as
America Online, CompuServe, Microsoft Network, and Prodigy have almost twelve million
subscribers in United States); see also Byassee, supra note 1, at 220 n.12 (describing Internet
service providers); Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231 (noting that commercial online services
had just under twelve million individual subscribers in 1996).
69 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating some BBSs offer users links to Internet); ACLU, 929
F. Supp. at 833-34 (stating that with small investment, individuals, non-profit organizations,
advocacy groups, and businesses can offer bulletin board service with proprietary content
where members, subscribers or customers can exchange information); see also Byassee, supra
note 1, at 220 n.13 (discussing role of BBSs in cyberspace and operation of bulletin board
services); Faucher, supra note 57, at 1045-49 (describing growth, advantages, and problems
associated with computer bulletin boards); Zembek, supra note 54, at 381 n.24 (describing BBSs
as cross between billboard and morning newspaper while noting key distinctions between
two).
70 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating that Internet service providers are generally
commercial entities); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 833 (stating individuals can access Internet by
patronizing "computer coffee shop" where customers can use Internet access provided by
shop for charge while enjoying cup of coffee); see also Topping, supra note 58, at 198 (citing
discussion in ACLU v. Reno, regarding Internet access at "storefront computer coffee shops").
71 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926-28 (discussing categories of Internet use); ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 834-36 (discussing variety of methods to communicate and exchange information
over Internet); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231 (explaining that Internet access
allows communication and information retrieval methods that transmit text, sound, pictures,
and moving video images); Rollo, supra note 1, at 677-78 (discussing Internet's numerous
methods for information retrieval and communication).
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sound, visual images and moving video images. 72 One such method
of communication is one-to-one messaging, of which the most
popular is electronic mail (known as "e-mail"). 73 One-to-many
messaging, such as "listservs," 74 provides many subscribers with
information on particular subjects of interest to them by allowing
people to subscribe to a "listserv" mailing list on a topic.75
Distributed message databases, such as "USENET newsgroups" 76
cover a broad range of topics and are among the most popular and
widely used services on the Internet.77 "USENET newsgroups" are
similar to "listservs" in function, in that they are forums to
72 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926-27 (discussing categories of Internet use); ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 834 (discussing "wide variety of different methods of communication and
information exchange over the network"); see also Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231
(explaining that once one has access there are "a wide variety of communication and
information retrieval methods"); Rollo, supra note 1, at 677-78 (discussing some of Internet's
numerous forms of information retrieval and communication").
73 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927 (explaining e-mail as perhaps most used Internet service
whereby user can use any of many available "mailers" software capable of reading and
writing e-mail to address and transmit electronic letter); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834 (stating e-
mail does not take predetermined path but takes varying paths to recipient, depending on
traffic); Kalow, supra note 7, at 2244 (stating that in 1997 approximately thirty-five to sixty
million people worldwide used e-mail); see also Byassee, supra note 1, at 201 n.17 (stating that
each user of e-mail has unique address which is expressed in standard format, such as,
jdoe888@stjohns.edu, with section before "@" symbol representing user name on local system
and section after symbol representing identity of computer on Internet).
74 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927 (describing different kinds of "listservs"); ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 834 (describing listserv" as "mail exploders" because of numerical multiplicity of
subscribers that receive message from single list); Vasiliki Pagidas, First Amendment - Freedom
of Speech - Provisions of the Comnunications Decency Act of 1996 Intended to Protect Minors from
Exposure to Indecent and Patently Offensive Material on the Internet Violate the First Amendment -
Reno v. A CLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997), 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 975, 977 n.13 (1998) (describing
"listser's" and "mail exploders" as automatic mailing list services); Topping, supra note 58, at
198 n.79 (specifying "listervs" as example of one-to-many messaging); Rachel Weintraub-
Reiter, Hate Speech Over the Internet: A Traditional Constitutional Analysis or a New Cyber
Constitution?, 8 B.U. PuB. INT. L. J. 145, 158 n.114 (1998) (citing "listserv" as example of
automatic mailing list service).
75 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927 (describing different kinds of "listservs"); ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 834 (noting there are thousands of "listservs" with hundreds of thousands of
subscribers); Kalow, supra note 7, at 2245 (indicating "listservs" are electronic mailing lists
created by interest groups).
76 See Byassee, supra note 1, at 201 n.16 (describing USENET as "network-scale computer
conferencing system that manages multiple public conversations, organized hierarchically
into specific topics," where each specific topic is discussed in separate group, and explaining
users may subscribe individually to any group, and subscribed user receives all messages
posted to group); Communities Virtual and Real: Social and Political Dynamics of Law in
Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1586, 1591 n.41-42 (1999) (describing "USENET newsgroups"
and "listservs"); David J. Loundy, E-Law 4: Conputer Information Systems Law and System
Operator Liabilihy, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1075, 1186 (1998) (discussing how news travels in this
medium); Paul K. Ohm, On Regulating the Internet: USENET, A Case Study, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1941, 1945-47 (1999) (explaining in detail how USENET works).§
77 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (stating that in 1994, approximately 100,000 messages
were posted daily on newsgroups and those messages were distributed to approximately
190,000 computers or computer networks that participate in USENET system).
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disseminate and exchange information on a specific topic, but differ
in that users need not subscribe in advance to receive the
information. 78 Real time communication, such as "Internet Relay
Chat" allows two or more individuals on the Internet to meet and
engage in dialogue with other people on the Internet in "real time,"
analogous to a telephone party line.79
Remote information retrieval, such as file transfer protocol ("ftp"),
"gopher" servers ("gopher") and the "World Wide Web"
("WWW"), are methods of locating and retrieving information
stored on remote computers. 80 File-transfer protocol is a method by
which a user can contact a server, view a directory of files, and copy
one or more of those files to his computer.81 "Gopher" guides an
individual's search through remote computers by presenting
information in a set of increasingly narrow menus which allow the
user to locate a desired file.8 2 The World Wide Web ,83 an area of the
78 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835; Byassee, supra note 1, at 201 n.17 (noting that unlike
"USENET" messages, e-mail message are sent only to individuals to whom they are
addressed); Communities Virtual and Real, supra note 76, at 1609 n.41-42 (defining USENET
newsgroups and listservs).
79 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (stating that some commercial online services have
"chat" systems which allow their members to communicate virtually instantly); Byassee, supra
note 1, at 201 n.18; Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Seeking Shelter fron the MP3 Storm: How Far Does the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 7 COMM. L.
CONSPECTUS 423, 440-41 (1999) (describing Internet Relay Chat); Tjerk Vonck, Welcome to the
milRC Hoinepage: IRC FAQ, at <http://www.mirc.com/ircintro.htm> (visited November 8,
1999) (detailing history, instructions and frequently asked questions relating to Internet Relay
Chat).
80 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 928 (stating that someone wishing to make article, file, or
software available to other users will set up server which adheres to certain communications
protocols and is capable of retrieving and presenting stored information in response to
request using same communications protocol); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835-36 (discussing
primary methods of locating and retrieving information on Internet); Developments in the Law-
The Law of Cyberspace: Introduction, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1574, 1579 (1999) (stating that World
Wide Web is most popular form of remote information retrieval); Rolo, supra note 1, at 676-77
and n.112 (stating that there are many ways to retrieve information through Internet);
Timothy Zick, Congress, The Internet, and the Intractable Pornography Problem: The Child Online
Protection Act of 1998, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1147, 1154-55 (1999) (stating that diverse body of
information can be retrieved).
81 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 928 n.8 ("To locate files available for copying, a user can
contact an 'Archie' server- a remote computer capable of searching directories for file names
containing a particular string of characters on FTP servers permitting anonymous retrieval");
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (describing file transfer protocol method); Byassee, supra note 1, at
220 n.19 (explaining how one can transfer files using fie transfer protocol); Markiewicz, supra
note 79, at 445 n.72 (explaining that file transfer protocols often control access); Securities
Activity on the Internet: Report of the Internet Task Force to the Technical Committee, 1128
PLI/CORP 533, 545 (June-July 1999) (stating file transfer protocol useful for downloading
files).
82 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929 (stating that content provider who maintains gopher server
has no way of knowing who will gain access to available information); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at
835-36 (identifying "gopher" as another approach to remote information retrieval); Byassee,
supra note 1, at 220 n.21 (describing "gopher" method of retrieving information); Susan B.
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Internet which has recently exploded in popularity,84 is similar to
"Gopher" in principal. The Web provides users with a medium to
locate and access information on the Internet.85 It links together
diversified information on Internet-linked computers by setting
common information storage formats ("HTML")86 and a common
language for the exchange of Web documents ("HTTP").87 A user
must have a Web "browser" 88 capable of displaying documents
Hutches, Using the Internet and Other Electronic Resources for Employee Benefits Research, 445
PLI/TAX 259, 266 (July 1999) (noting that gopher is used to navigate Internet).
83 See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 710 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that World
Wide Web is used to provide information); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 836 (explaining that World
Wide Web was originally developed at European Particle Physics Laboratory (CERN) to allow
researchers and engineers throughout world to communicate and share information, and then
it spread to other areas, making World Wide Web available globally to anyone); Leonard T.
Naura, Darren K. Rydberg & Howard P. Bernard, WA/hat Lawyers Need to Know About the
Internet, 198 N.J. LAW. 9, 10 (Aug. 1999) (stating that World Wide Web expanded Internet).
84 See Ian C. Ballon, Internet Issues for the Travel Industry, 790 PLI/CoMM. 11, 19 (1999)
(indicating that with help of World Wide Web there are over 30 million Internet users);
Developments in the Law - The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 80, at 1634 n.2 (1999) (indicating that
World Wide Web contains at least 320 million web pages); Kalow, supra note 7, at 2245
(discussing recent popularity explosion of World Wide Web); Naura, supra note 83, at 10
(indicating that World Wide Web has grown considerably since it was developed in 1994);
Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 231 (noting that in 1999, 200 million Internet users were
expected); Rollo, supra note 1, at 694 n.107 (explaining that in 1996 approximately 40 million
people used Internet, and that number was expected to increase to 200 million by 1999).
85 See Matthew A. Chambers, Investment Advisers and Investment Companies on the Internet,
1046 PLI/CORP. 605, 613 (1998) (noting that hyperlinks make World Wide Web easy to use);
Mark Pruner, Legal Websites: Creation, Marketing, Disintermediation and Ethics, 525 PLI/PAT 83,
89 (June 1998) (stating that World Wide Web is easy to navigate); see also Byassee, supra note 1,
at 220 n.22 (describing how documents displayed on World Wide Web contain imbedded
remote location information to retrieve another document); Tammy S. Trout-McIntyre,
Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Does the Shoe Fit?, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 223, 226 (1997)
(describing ease of using World Wide Web).
86 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929 (explaining that HTML, or hypertext markup language, is
standard Web formatting language); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 836 (defining HTML as formatting
language); Jason R. Berne, Court Intervention but Not in a Classic Fonn: A Survey of Remedies in
Internet Trademark Cases, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1157, 1167 (1999) (stating that HTML is basic
programming language); Julia Alpert Gladstone, Using the Internet for Effective Legal Research,
542 PLI/PAT 29, 32 (Dec. 1998) (stating that HTML allows World Wide Web users to move
between pages); Naura, supra note 83, at 10 (describing use of hypertext markup language);
Rollo, supra note 1, at 677 (stating documents in hypertext markup language stored globally).
87 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929 (stating that HTTP, or hypertext transfer protocol, is
common communication protocol on Web, and allows users to move seamlessly between
documents regardless of their location); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838 (describing HTTP as
common language for exchange of Web documents); Aileen A. Pisciotta, Regulation of
International Communications in the Age of the Internet: Lagging Behind the Future, 33 INT'L LAW.
367, 369 (1999) (indicating that HTTP furthered tremendous growth of World Wide Web);
Rollo, supra note 1, at 677 (stating that World Wide Web documents use hypertext transfer
protocol which allows users to transfer documents without knowing their location).
88 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929 (giving examples such as Netscape Navigator, Mosaic and
Internet Explorer); Gladstone, supra note 86, at 33 (indicating that HTML allows browsers to
display hypertext); Jonathan B. Ko, Para-Sites: The Case for Hyperlinking as Copyright
Iifingemnent, 18 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 361, 364-65 (1998) (stating that browsers are used to
retrieve documents); Naura, supra note 83, at 11 (indicating that browsers enable user to
hyperlink web pages).
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formatted in HTTP, and each document has an address, known as a
Uniform Resource Locator ("URL"), which identifies the server on
which it resides.89 A user may utilize a "search engine" to help him
navigate the Web.90
The Web is a system running on tens of thousands of individual
computers, with no centralized control.91 Users may transfer
between one Web site and another site on a different computer by
pointing and clicking on underlined phrases called "hyperlinks"
(also called "links").92 These links allow a user to travel from site to
site, which may be located on different servers in different states.93
This intricate system creates "an on-line world with no physical
boundaries." 94 The ease with which the Web can be explored,
89 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929 (discussing how documents on World Wide Web are
accessed); Young June (Jay) Yang, Domain Names and Trademarks on the Internet: Asian Pacific
Rim Perspective, 564 PLI/PAT 295, 299 (June 1999) (indicating that URLs differentiate web
pages); Naura, supra note 83, at 11 (indicating that URLs are addresses used to find precise
locations); Rollo, supra note 1, at 677 (noting that World Wide Web uses URLs to locate
information).
90 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929 (listing Yahoo, Magellan, Alta Vista, WebCrawler and
Lycos as search engines); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837 (listing same search engines); see also
Terence C. Halliday, A New Approach to the Dynamic Organization of Knowledge, 17 LAW & HIST.
REV. 609, 609 (1999) (noting that search engines are retrieval systems and suggesting
alternative method of searching); Marcus J. Millet, Same Game in a New Domain-Some Trademark
Issues on the Internet, 198 AUG. N.J. LAW. 32, 33 (1999) (describing user's ability to locate
information through search engine); Steven Richman, A Guide for the Perplexed: Legal Research
on the Internet, 198 AUG. N.J. LAW. 53, 53 (1999) (describing how search engines are used).
91 See Shea 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating that no entity controls content made publicly
available, nor limits access to Internet); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838 (stating Web known as
"distributed system" running on tens of thousands of individual computers); Byassee, supra
note 1, at 200-01 (stating that Internet operates by informal agreements of users and formal
agreements between owners of large network computers); see also Ballon supra note 84, at 19
(indicating there is no sole ownership of Internet); Naura supra note 83, at 9 (indicating
Internet is not controlled or owned by single organization).
92 See John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism,
74 IND. L.J. 893, 900 (1999) (noting that hyperlinks are used to access web pages); Millet supra
note 90, at 33 (describing use of hyperlinks); see also ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 836 (stating that
hyperlinks allow information to be accessed and organized in flexible ways); Kath Brown,
Finding a Way Through the Fascinating Maze, DAILY NEWS (NEW PLYMOUTH), Sep. 18, 2000, at *7
(describing hyperlinks as "those blue words.. .just ask[ing] to be clicked").
93 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837 (identifying WW-W as "unique" tool whose power
"stems from the ability of a link to point to any document, regardless of its status or physical
location"); Rothchild, supra note 92, at 900 (stating hyperlinks can point to Web pages on any
computer in world that is set up as Web server).
94 Kalow, supra note 7, at 2247; see also Jason L. Brodsky, Civil Procedure - Surfin' the Stream
of Commerce: Compuserve v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), 70 TEMP. L. REV. 825, 825
(1997) (describing Internet as "faceless, nameless, and existing in reality beyond physical
boundaries"). But see Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Note, On Law & Technology, Casting the Net: Another
Confitsing Analysis of Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts in Telco Communications v. An
Apple a Day, 32 RICH. L. REV. 505, 543 n.4 (1998) (criticizing theory for its "failure to account
for the fact that such transmitted information must reside on a machine located in physical
space and that access to this 'world' requires the use of another machine in a specific
identifiable location").
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combined with the low entry barriers involved,95 has made it an
ideal platform for connecting and sharing information. Many
organizations and individuals now publish 96 documents called
"home pages," 97 on the World Wide Web.98 Once this information is
published, it is accessible to any person or organization with
Internet access.99
III. CASES INVOLVING PERSONAL JURISDICTION ON THE INTERNET
While there is scant authority on the issue of personal jurisdiction
based on Internet contacts, most courts have agreed that "the
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of the
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."100 In
doing so, courts have articulated three categories of situations along
a "sliding scale" 101 for evaluating jurisdictional cases based on
Internet web sites.102 The court in Zippo Manufacturing Company v.
Zippo Dot Corn explained that "this sliding scale is consistent with
well developed personal jurisdiction principles."'103
95 See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929 (referring to low monthly fee to connect to Internet);
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837 (personal computers at price of $1,500); Michael E. Boersma,
International Business Transactions, the Internet, and the Convention on the Internet Sale of Goods:
Preventing Unintentional Pitfalls, 7 J. D.C.L. INTL L. & PRAc. 107, 109-110 (1998) (discussing
cost of World Wide Web); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Christopher J. Lhilier, Infonnation Access
Rights Based on International Human Rigits Law, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 899 (1997) (indicating that
World Wide Web is inexpensive).
96 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837 (explaining Internet publishing); Kalow, supra note 7, at
2245 (explaining people who publish or create their own web sites are called "site operators").
97 See Mayewski, supra note 7, at 310 (indicating that home page is also called "web site");
Lydia M. Karlowicz & Lulit Bezuayehu, Serve up Your Own Web Site, PC/COMPUTING, Jan.
1997, at 310 (instructing how to set up own web server and web site); Thomas E. Weber, How
Do I Create My Own Webpage?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at R25 (describing how easy it is to
create and operate homepage).
98 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837; Kalow, supra note 7, at 2246.
99 See Carl W. Chamberlin, To the Millenniun, Emerging Issues for the Year 2000 and
Cyberspace, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 131, 165 (1999); Rothchild, supra note 9Z
at 932; Michael Traynor, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: 1999 and Looking Ahead, 564
PLI/PAT 109,111 (1999) (discussing principles regarding personal jurisdiction and Internet).
100 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see
also Millennium Enters., Inc., v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 915 (D. Or. 1999)
(citing sliding scale test articulated in Zippo and citing numerous cases doing same);
Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 636, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(discussing Zippo and using same test).
101 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
102 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; see also Millennium Music, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 915
(discussing "sliding scale" as enumerated in Zippo); Patriot Sys., Inc., v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F.
Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 1998) (describing different considerations on "sliding scale").
103 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; see also Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel, 49 F. Supp. 2d 743,
747-48 (D.NJ 1999) (following Zippo); Millennium Music, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 915 (describing
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At one end of the scale are situations where the defendant
repeatedly conducted business over the Internet with residents of
the forum by engaging in repeated or ongoing transactions with
forum residents, or entered into contracts with residents of the
forum state. 104 These activities within the forum state, combined
with the presence of the web site, often provide sufficient minimum
contacts for an exercise of personal jurisdiction. 05 Courts have also
found that when the causes of action involve intentional torts
committed over the Internet and directed towards a forum resident,
the defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum and thus is
subject to personal jurisdiction within that state. 106
At the other end of the scale are passive web sites, which are sites
that merely provide information, such as advertisements. 07 The
courts have concluded that when the only contact between the
defendant and the forum state is the existence of a passive web site,
the courts will decline to assert personal jurisdiction.108 Where,
spectrum); K.C.P.L., Inc., v. Nash, No. 98 Civ. 3773, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18464, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1998) (collecting cases); Patriot Sys., 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (explaining
categories); Blackburn, 999 F. Supp. at 638 (defining categories).
104 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
105 See Millennium Music, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 915 (discussing end of scale where defendant
conducts business over Internet, allowing assertion of jurisdiction); see also CompuServe, Inc.,
v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738,
743-44 (W.D. Tex. 1998); Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
106 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (holding, in non Internet
case, where defendant has continuously and deliberately exploited market, it must anticipate
being haled into court where tortious act was committed); Panavision v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d.
1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)); Hugel v. McNeil, 886
F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Alta Vista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 466-67
(D. Mass. 1997) (involving intentional tort claims); EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l,
Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Ariz. 1996) (dealing with claims of libel, defamation, and
tortious interference of contract).
107 See Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997) (discussing passive Web
sites); Zippo 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (articulating passive Web sites); see also Andrew E. Costa,
Minninn Contacts in Cyberspace: A Taxonomy of the Case Law, 35 Hous. L. REv. 453, 481 (1988)
(discussing passive Web sites); Vartanian, It's a Question of Jurisdiction, 8 BuS. L. TODAY 22, 24
(1999) (discussing courts that have asserted jurisdiction over passive Web sites).
108 See Patriot Sys., 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (finding assertion of jurisdiction based solely on
existence of passive web site insufficient); No Mayo-San Francisco v. Memminger, No. C-98-
1392, 1998 WL 544974, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998); CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. CFO 2 Go, Inc., No.
C-97-4676 SI, 1998 WL 320821, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 5,1998); SF Hotel Company v. Energy Inv.,
985 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D. Kan. 1997) (declining to assert jurisdiction based solely on
defendant's passive Web site); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97-C-4943, 1997
WL 733905, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1365
(W.D. Ark. 1997); Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Products, No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997
WL 276232, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Hearst Corp. v. Ari Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL
97097, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (declining to exert personal jurisdiction based on defendant's
passive Web site); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding
jurisdiction based on defendant's Web site in conjunction with other contacts); Bensuan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding jurisdiction lacking
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however, the defendant has minimum contacts with the state other
than the existence of a passive web site, the court uses those other
contacts to determine whether personal jurisdiction should be
exercised over the defendant.109
The gray area in the middle of the scale involves situations where
a defendant operates an interactive web site, allowing a user to
exchange information with a host computer.110 In these instances,
courts have come to differing conclusions.11 Some courts find the
existence of an interactive web site alone is sufficient to establish
minimum contacts, 112 while other courts require additional contacts
with the forum not related to the underlying claim in the present
case. 1 3 Still other courts require additional contacts with the forum
relating to the cause of action.1 4
based on defendant's passive Web site); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp.
161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding assertion of jurisdiction proper based on defendant's Web
site with other contacts).
109 See CompuServe, 89 F.3d. at 1264 (discussing defendant's contract with plaintiff); Alta
Vista, 960 F. Supp. at 464 (discussing defendant's contacts with forum); Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at
1124 (examining level of activity in forum conducted by defendant); EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at
417 (discussing defendants contacts with forum).
110 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126 (discussing "middle ground"); Rolo, supra note 1, at
690 (discussing middle ground); Vartanian, supra note 107, at 634 (discussing middle ground).
111 See GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 39 (D.D.C.
1998) (discussing how creation of interactive website within reach of forum residents
establishes minimum contacts because defendant had invoked benefits and privileges of
conducting activities in forum state); Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 786-88
(E.D. Tex. 1998) (discussing how defendant's act of responding to all inquires about
advertised product on website constituted additional contact not related to underlying claim);
Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 42-44 (D. Mass. 1997) (maintaining
website that court described as 'national magazine," which could be constantly accessed by
forum residents, constitutes contact with forum unrelated to underlying claim); EDIAS, 947 F.
Supp. at 417 (discussing how defendant's fax, e-mail and Internet communications subjected
defendant to specific jurisdiction).
112 See GTE New Media Services, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 39 (discussing how creation of
interactive website within reach of forum residents establishes minimum contacts because
defendant had invoked benefits and privileges of conducting activities in forum state); Scherr
v. Abrahams, No. 97 C 5453, 1998 WL 299678 (N.D. II. 1998); Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats,
Inc., No. 97 C 8745, 1998 WL 246152 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (rejecting notion of interactive website as passive
advertisement).
113 See Mieczkowski, 997 F. Supp. at 786-88 (discussing how defendant's act of responding
to all inquires about advertised product on website constituted additional contact not related
to underlying claim); Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 42-44 (maintaining website court described as
"national magazine," which could be constantly accessed by forum residents, constitutes
contact with forum unrelated to underlying claim); Heroes, Inc., v. Heroes Found., 958 F.
Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1996) (soliciting charitable contributions from members of the forum);
EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. at 417 (discussing how defendant's fax, e-mail and Internet
communications subjected defendant to specific jurisdiction).
114 See Park Inns Int'l v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 762, 765-66 (D. Ariz. 1998)
(discussing how posting of hotel profile on website resulted in reservations from forum
residents); American Networks, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp.
494, 498-500 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing how sending software to customers whose interests
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In Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Corn," 5 the court
announced a test to be applied in this area, holding that where a
defendant operates an interactive Web site "the exercise of
jurisdiction [should be] determined by examining the level of
interactivity and [the] commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Web site."116 In Millennium
Enterprises, Inc., v. Millennium Music, LP,117 the court articulated a
third requirement to be added to the Zippo test, so as to include the
"fundamental requirement of personal jurisdiction."118 To fulfill this
requirement there must be "'deliberate action' within the forum
state in the form of transactions between the defendant and
residents of the forum or conduct of the defendant purposefully
directed at residents of the forum state."119
IV. WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?
At the time of Pennoyer v. Neff state boundaries were the signposts
limiting personal jurisdiction.120 Jurisdiction has since expanded to
accommodate the changes in the way business is done.121 In
were sparked via website constitutes contact with forum relating to underlying cause of
action); Alta Vista, 960 F. Supp. at 466-67 (discussing how tortious conduct of
misrepresentation, when directed at forum through website, is conduct with forum related to
underlying cause of action).
115 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
116 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; see also Kalow, supra note 7, at 2274 (concluding that courts
must concentrate analysis on Web activity); Matthew Oetker, Personal Jurisdiction and the
Internet, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 613, 629-30 (1999) (discussing interactivity); David L. Stott, Personal
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Constitutional Boundanj of Minimum Contacts Limited to a Web Site,
15 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. INFO. L. 819, 852-54 (1997) (discussing approach toward jurisdiction
taken in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion)
as analyzing interactivity).
117 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 921 (D. Or. 1999).
118 See id. (stating "the fundamental requirement of personal jurisdiction is 'deliberate
action' within the forum state in the form of transactions between the defendant and residents
of the forum or conduct of the defendant purposely directed at the residents of the forum
state") (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90) (1984)); see also Marguerite S. Dougherty,
The L.anhain Act: Keeping Pace With Technology, 7 J. L. & POL'Y 455, 494 (1999) (discussing
Millenninnm); Oetker, supra note 116, at 633 n.158 (discussing Millennium); Traynor, supra note
99, at 116 (discussing Millenniun).
119 Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (discussing "deliberate action"); see also Panavision
Int'l, L.P., v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (classifying defendant's actions over
Internet as intentional); CompuServe Inc., v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996)
(describing defendant's contacts as intentional); EDIAS Software Int'l, L.LC., v. BASIS Int'l
Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Ariz. 1996) (concluding harms caused by defendant's Web site
were intentional).
120 See Hamilton and Castanias, supra note 3, at 29; Klingbaum, supra note 3, at 149;
Mammen, supra note 3, at 712.
121 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1985).
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expanding personal jurisdiction, the Court rejected the notion that
personal jurisdiction might turn on "mechanical tests,"122 but
instead emphasized the need for a "highly realistic" approach.123
Courts stopped defining jurisdiction by physical presence within a
state, and began to determine whether personal jurisdiction could
be exercised based on the more flexible and fact specific "minimum
contacts" test enunciated in International Shoe.124 That minimum
contacts test was then refined again and again to reflect the
changing needs of a society increasingly dependent on
technology.125 Even while expanding allowances of personal
jurisdiction, the Court limits this expansion to be sure that it
comports with Due Process. Utilizing the Due Process Clause
"gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit."126 In reworking the rules of personal
jurisdiction to the Internet, these rules must adhere to the Due
Process restriction.127 In adapting the rules of personal jurisdiction
to fit this new technology, the court should recognize that once
122 See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478-79.
123 See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478-79 (describing doctrine as having to be flexible);
Logue, supra note 53, at 221 (discussing "highly realistic" approach); Christopher Lyon, The
Ninth Circuit's Approad to Personal Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Cases: How Long is the Ann
of California Courts in Reacing Foreign Defendants?, 15 LOy. L.A. ENT. L. J. 661 (1995).
124 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 362 U.S. 310 (1945); see also Sheehan, supra
note 49, at 440 n.103 (discussing "'highly realistic' approach").
125 See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257,
352 (1999) (discussing expansion of minimum contacts to cover symbolic forms of presence in
forum); see, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
126 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980); see also Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (suggesting that "random" or "fortuitous" sales of
magazines in forum would not render non-resident defendant publisher subject to personaljurisdiction); Paul Eric Clay, Quest for a Bright Line Personal Jurisdiction Rule in Contract
Disputes-Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 61 WASH. L. REv. 703, 730, n.132 (1986) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen); Stephen E. Smith, Due Process and the Subpoena Power in Federal
Environmental, Health, and Safety Whistleblower Proceedings, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 533, 560, n.79
(1998) (comparing forseeability of suit in forum jurisdiction in context of whistleblower suits).
127 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Kalow, supra note 7, at 6; see
also Bender, Personal Jurisdiction and Web Sites, 547 P.L.I. HAN. SER. 67, 82 (1999) (illustrating
due process considerations); Eric H. Findlay, Litigation on the Net: Personal Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace, 62 TEX. B.J. 334, 341, n.7 (1999) (mentioning due process considerations); Michael
MacClary, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 93, 97-98 (1998)
(discussing expansion of personal jurisdiction in light of due process concerns); Oetker, supra
note 116, at 631 (discussing due process considerations); Sanchez, supra note 9, at 1703
(discussing due process considerations).
[Vol. 15:139
2000] PERSONAL JURISDICTION & THE INTERNET
information on a Web site is published, it is accessible to any person
or organization with Internet access, all over the world.1 28
In situations of interactive web sites where the defendant plainly
conducts business over the Internet with residents of the forum,
there is no question that personal jurisdiction may be exercised.129
The traditional minimum contacts test can be applied to these cases
without need for alteration to accommodate this technology. The
defendant's activities, whether or not over the Internet, constitute
the minimum contacts with the forum state necessary for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Where the defendant has
conducted business within the forum, or otherwise purposefully
availed himself of the protections of the forum, he has sufficient
minimum contacts with the state to subject him to personal
jurisdiction.130 It is through these contacts with the forum state that
defendants purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of doing
business in the forum 131 or specifically target that forum state for
business, 132 and the conduct is such that being haled into that forum
state to defend a suit is foreseeable.133
The majority of courts have come to the appropriate decision
regarding passive web sites, and most courts are likely to decide
128 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837 (identifying world wide web as "unique" tool whose
power "stems from the ability of a link to point to any document, regardless of its status or
physical location"); Millet supra note 90, at 33 (describing use of hyperlinks); Rothchild, supra
note 92, at 900 (noting that hyperlinks are used to access web pages).
129 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-26 (W.D. Pa.)
(holding defendant amenable to personal jurisdiction in forum state where defendant
company contracted with three thousand individuals and seven companies within forum state
to provide news services).
130 See Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
party making contracts with parties in forum state was subject to personal jurisdiction even
where contacts to state were entirely electronic).
131 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see also Goldstein, Emerging Issues in Online
Advertising and Promotion Law, 570 PL.I. HAN. SER. 821, 869 (1999) (advising Web site owners
to disclaim purposeful availment); Rollo, supra note 1, at 672 (discussing purposeful
availment); Vartanian, supra note 107, at 23 (discussing purposeful availment).
132 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (acknowledging
jurisdiction may be proper regardless of defendant's physical presence in forum);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) (requiring more
than defendant making purchases from forum state, if personal jurisdiction is asserted in
cause of action not related to those transactions); Lampert, The Internet and Personal
Jurisdiction, 198 N.J. LAW. MAG. 47 (1999) (discussing "specifically targeted"); Rollo, supra note
1, at 689 (stating court in CoinpuServe found that defendant "specifically targeted" forum).
133 See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating at least
12,000 residents in forum could have accessed defendant's Web site). But see World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (stating that foreseeability alone has
never been sufficient basis for exercising personal jurisdiction); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 235 (1958) (finding foreseeability alone insufficient to assert jurisdiction).
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such cases similarly in the future. 134 These courts have held that the
existence of a passive web site alone does not provide the requisite
minimum contacts required for an exercise of personal
jurisdiction.135 By creating a passive web site, a defendant has in no
way purposefully availed herself of the privilege of doing business
in the forum 136 or specifically targeted that forum state for
business.137 Moreover, a defendant does not, by the nature of her
conduct, anticipate nor foresee being haled into court in the forum
state. Operators of passive Web sites have no control over who
accesses their web sites, which once published, are accessible to any
person all over the world with Internet access. Since these Web site
operators do not purposefully avail themselves of the forum, a court
would be hard pressed to find a valid basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. Not only would it be unjust and unfair for the
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over operators of passive Web
sites, but declining to do so would aid in the development of this
technology. Allowing these web site operators to structure their
conduct so that they may operate without fear of being haled into
any and all forums based solely on the existence of their Web site
will stimulate economic and technological advances. 138
134 See Jefferson F. Scher, Swapping Claims in Cyberspace: Legal/Technical Context and
Negotiation Strategies for Domain Name Deals, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 545, 564 (1999)
(discussing court decisions requiring some affirmative act by party in order to become subject
to personal jurisdiction of forum); see also Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that absent "plus-factors" such as toll-free numbers, web site
simply promoting local activities for benefit of local users was insufficient to warrant exercise
of personal jurisdiction), aff d, 126 F.3d. 25 (2d. Cir. 1997).
135 See Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
maintaining web site accessible in forum (but not hosted there) is not sufficient in itself to
establish basis for personal jurisdiction).
136 See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 248 (finding no personal jurisdiction in Florida over Delaware
trust company simply because the will that established trust was probated in Florida); see also
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating defendant had not
purposely availed itself of forum's benefits or laws); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (stating operation of passive Web site by defendant is not
sufficient to assert jurisdiction); Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299 (stating mere posting of Web
site is insufficient to assert jurisdiction).
137 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418 (stating that mere purchases from forum are
insufficient to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendant). But see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476
(acknowledging jurisdiction may be asserted without physical presence of defendant). See,
e.g., Lampert, supra note 132, at 50 (discussing whether electronic transmissions from website
are "specifically targeted" at particular forum).
138 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (holding that mere likelihood that product
will be in forum state insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); see also Costa, supra note
107, at 459 (stating due process considerations are intended to give defendant degree of
predictability with regard to his activities); Hamilton and Castanias, supra note 3, at 28 (stating
defendant should be forewarned of possible suit); Kalow, supra note 7, at 2269 (discussing
predictability).
PERSONAL JUIRISDICTION & THE INTERNET
With respect to the middle area of the sliding scale, the court in
Millennium 139 has probably come closest to the ideal. By looking at
the commercial nature of the web site,140 the nature of the exchange
of information that occurs through the site,141 and requiring
deliberate action on the defendant's part with residents of the forum
state, 142 the court successfully adapted the rules of personal
jurisdiction within the confines of Due Process.
CONCLUSION
We should be reminded of what the Supreme Court emphasized
in Hanson v. Denckla, 143 that "it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 144 By examining
the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the exchange
of information that occurs through a Web site, and by requiring the
defendant to purposefully avail himself of the forum, the spirit of
the minimum contacts test remains the same. This approach allows
for the flexibility essential in recognition of the needs of technology,
while remaining true to the fundamental precept of personal
jurisdiction, which is a deliberate action within the forum state.
As an increasing number of businesses advertise and do business
over the Internet, the issue of asserting personal jurisdiction will be
addressed more frequently. The approach set out above will allow
the courts to structure their inquiry into whether a court may
exercise jurisdiction over such a defendant in a way that adheres to
the spirit and notion of the International Shoe test, along with its
progeny, while accommodating the new issues technology, and
specifically the Internet, have brought into the query.
Carly Henek
139 See Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 915 (D. Or.
1999).
140 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (stating amount and type of business done over Internet
relevant to personal jurisdiction).
141 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (discussing difference between active and passive Web
sites).
142 See Millennmmn, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (stating deliberate action fundamental to
personal jurisdiction).
143 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
144 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; see also Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416-17
(9th Cir. 1997) (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); Rollo, supra note 1, at 672
(quoting Hanson); Traynor, supra note 99, at 112-13 (quoting Hanson).
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